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Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence 
of Monopoly: Reply 
By JENNIFER F. REINGANUM* 
In my 1983 article in this Review, I re- 
ported results (based upon a stochastic model 
of invention) which were at variance with 
those (based upon a deterministic model of 
invention) reported previously in 1982 by 
Richard Gilbert and David Newbery (here- 
after G-N). 
In their comment, G-N claim that the 
differences in our respective results arise not 
due to the presence or absence of uncer- 
tainty, as I suggested, but due to (in my 
model) 1) a different assumption about the 
timing of moves in the R&D game, 2) the 
absence of free entry, and 3) assumed dis- 
economies in the management of the firm. 
The model in my paper was intentionally 
highly simplified, eschewing the issues of 
fixed costs and free entry, because the point 
was simple and intuitive. The point was not 
that preemption-or a weaker notion, sto- 
chastic preemption-would never occur. Nor 
did I claim that a deterministic invention 
process was either necessary or sufficient for 
preemption. My point was simply that when 
uncertainty is introduced into the G-N de- 
terministic bidding model, the equilibrium 
outcome is quite different: in the determinis- 
tic model, the monopolist persists with prob- 
ability one, while in the stochastic model, the 
monopolist will suffer entry-not just with 
positive probability-but with probability 
greater than one-half. Thus their conclusions 
regarding the likelihood of persistence are 
highly sensitive to the assumption of a de- 
terministic invention process. Of course, this 
is not to say that their conclusions (or mine) 
are not equally sensitive to other modeling 
assumptions. In the sequel, I will examine 
the role of alternative assumptions regarding 
the order of play, free entry, and managerial 
diseconomies. 
I. The Order of Play 
There is no explicit discussion in G-N's 
1982 article regarding the order of play in 
the game. However, indirect evidence tends 
to point toward simultaneous moves. For 
instance, " the strategy space for each firm is 
restricted to the research and development 
expenditure on product 2 and the price(s) the 
firm charges for the product(s) it sells" (p. 
516). That is, monopolist and entrants alike 
each pick an investment level; in a sequen- 
tial-move game, entrants would select a 
best-response function.1 
Moreover, G-N assert that their model is 
formally equivalent to a particular type of 
auction model in which firms enter bids for 
the innovation; the winning bidder must then 
spend the amount of its bid on R&D. This is 
essentially a first-price auction with complete 
and perfect information. It turns out that in 
this framework, there is no need to specify 
timing conventions at all. It is easy to show 
that the simultaneous-move equilibrium is 
identical to the equilibrium specified by 
G-N.2 Thus, regardless of the sequential or 
simultaneous nature of the bidding, the equi- 
librium outcome is the same. The agent with 
the highest valuation (in this case the in- 
cumbent monopolist) wins; however, the 
winner needs to pay only (a tiny bit more 
than) the amount of the next-highest valua- 
tion. 
*Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Cali- 
fornia Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125. 
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'In a related model, Partha Dasgupta and Joseph 
Stiglitz explicitly assume a leader-follower structure; 
they state that "active firms work on the reaction func- 
tion of potential entrants; i.e., entertain von Stackelberg 
conjectures regarding their behavior" (1980, p. 10). 
2Technically, if we think of this as a first-price auc- 
tion, then both the sequential-move and simultaneous- 
move equilibria are really "epsilon-equilibria," since 
there is no minimum winning bid. 
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Thus it is perfectly reasonable to compare 
G-N's bidding model with a stochastic in- 
vention model in which firms move simulta- 
neously. However, in evaluating their conjec- 
tures about the effects of uncertainty on their 
model, it is important to keep in mind their 
(implicit) sequential-move assumption. I will 
postpone until Section IV my comments on 
the appropriateness of the sequential-move 
framework. 
II. Unrestricted Entry 
Gilbert and Newbery emphasize that their 
model includes free entry,3 that mine doesn't, 
and that this is (at least in part) responsible 
for our differing results. The issue of free 
entry is a red herring. In their original paper 
they claim that free entry is not crucial to 
their result (and, indeed, it isn't). Im- 
mediately following their main argument, 
they state that ".... the same argument holds 
if competition for the patent is less intense, 
so that the potential entrant anticipates posi- 
tive profits instead of the zero profits implied 
by [free entry]" (pp. 516-17). Moreover, in 
their model it is only the most efficient chal- 
lenger which provides any competition for 
the incumbent; theirs may as well be a two- 
firm model. 
Nevertheless, consider what happens in my 
model if one adds fixed costs and allows 
unrestricted entry (obviously both must be 
added at once; due to the assumption of 
decreasing returns to investment, with no 
fixed costs the number of firms is infinite). 
The fixed cost, denoted F, does not affect 
equilibrium flow investment, only whether or 
not the challenger firm plays. Since F = 0 
implies infinitely many firms, and since the 
equilibrium challenger payoff with n firms 
can be shown to be decreasing in n (see my 
forthcoming paper), for any n one can find 
an F,n such that only the incumbent and n 
challengers want to play. For one challenger, 
this fixed cost is F1 = Vc(x7,x*). When n 
challengers play, the results are even stronger; 
now the incumbent firm invests less than 
each challenger. Thus its probability of per- 
sisting as a monopolist is less than 1/n. 
Thus unrestricted entry can easily be accom- 
modated without any weakening of my re- 
sults. 
III. Managerial Diseconomies 
"Managerial diseconomies exist if the 
monopolist cannot conduct a research pro- 
gram or production plan as efficiently as any 
rival" (G-N, 1982, p. 518). This would not 
ordinarily seem to rule out decreasing re- 
turns to scale in the invention technology, as 
long as both incumbent and challengers alike 
are subject to the same decreasing returns. 
Actually, G-N want to say that if no 
managerial diseconomies exist, then the mo- 
nopolist is as efficient as all rivals put to- 
gether. Essentially, one needs to be able to 
run parallel R&D projects at no worse than 
constant returns to scale. Gilbert and New- 
bery "extend" my model to a number of 
parallel projects without including a fixed 
cost per project. Since this leads to an in- 
finite number of parallel projects, they im- 
pose arbitrary upper bounds on the number 
of projects which may be undertaken by the 
incumbent and by challengers, and then dis- 
cuss what happens when these bounds are 
differentially relaxed. In my earlier paper I 
reported results based on a model with paral- 
lel projects; the details of this model are 
available in an unpublished technical ap- 
pendix. My own extension involved a fixed 
cost of K per project, and a flow cost, or 
research intensity, on each project. For sim- 
plicity, let the intensity be fixed at x, yielding 
hazard rate h = h(x), and let nI and nc 
denote the number of parallel projects cho- 
sen by the incumbent and the challenger, 
respectively. The payoff functions now take 
the forms4 
V'(n, nc) 
- [nIhnI(c)+ nchw1(c)+ R-nix] 
/[r + n1h + nchl-nIK 
3I interpret the term "free entry" as meaning unre- 
stricted, but not necessarily costless, entry. 
'The present value of profits to a monopolist using 
the new technology with unit cost c are Il(c), capital- 
ized profits to the incumbent and entrant if the entrant 
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and VC(ni,nc)= [nch7C(c)-ncxI 
/ [r+n,h+nchl-ncK, 
where it is assumed that hfl(c)-x>0, so 
that the challenger has at least a chance at 
positive profits if the innovation is drastic. 
Differentiating Vi with respect to ni, i = I, C 
and simplifying yields the following neces- 
sary conditions at an interior Nash equi- 
librium (nt, nc). 
(1) [r+n*h] [hfl(c)-x] 
-h[n*hwj(c)+R]-KB2 = 0 
(2) [r+n,h][hwc(c)-x]-KB2 = O, 
where B = r + n,h + n*h. 
PROPOSITION 1: If the innovation is drastic 
and R > 0, then n* &lt; n*; that is, the in- 
cumbent conducts fewer parallel projects than 
the challenger. 
PROOF: 
If the innovation is drastic, then 11(c)= 
7Tc(c) and 7T(c) = 0. Combining equations 
(1) and (2) yields 
(3) (n - n*) )[h1_(c)- x] = R. 
Since hfl(c)- x > 0, equation (3) requires 
that n, &lt; n*. 
Again, a simple continuity argument 
establishes that there is an open set of tech- 
nologies which are not drastic, but for which 
Proposition 1 remains valid.5 
IV. Conclusions 
Gilbert and Newbery have argued that 
alternative assumptions regarding the condi- 
tions of entry, economies of scale and the 
order of play (and not uncertainty) are re- 
sponsible for the differences in our respective 
results concerning the persistence of mo- 
nopoly. It seems clear from the above discus- 
sion that at least the first two of these al- 
ternatives can be accommodated with no 
effect on the results. The models outlined in 
my original paper and in the preceding pages 
herein all describe circumstances in which, 
were the invention process deterministic, the 
incumbent would persist as the monopolist. 
But in the stochastic formulation, the in- 
cumbent enjoys a lower marginal benefit to 
invention than does the challenger when the 
innovation is drastic, or nearly so. Conse- 
quently, the incumbent invests less than the 
challenger and, on average, entry occurs. 
All of my analysis is based upon interior 
Nash equilibria; that is, ones in which the 
challenger actually participates. Gilbert and 
Newbery object to assumptions which allow 
for the possibility of (or even guarantee) 
interior equilibria, saying that one cannot 
examine preemption and entry deterrence in 
such a framework. I think this takes an ex- 
tremely narrow view of preemption and en- 
try deterrence. When it is impossible to 
credibly preempt or deter entry with proba- 
bility one, it still makes sense to ask whether 
stochastic preemption or stochastic entry de- 
terrence are prevalent features of an in- 
dustry. That is, are potential entrants dis- 
couraged on average from participating, or 
do they participate to a lesser extent than 
they would in the absence of the incumbent's 
strategic behavior? 
I will concede that alternative assumptions 
regarding the order of play will typically 
yield different equilibrium results (G-N's de- 
terministic bidding model is one example in 
which the order of play is of no conse- 
quence). But I do question the appropriate- 
ness of G-N's assumed order of play, and the 
attribution of the undesirable consequences 
to the patent system. In their comment, G-N 
extend their own model to the case of uncer- 
tainty, making explicit their sequential-move 
patents the new technology are Tji(c) and 'rC(c), respec- 
tively. Current flow revenues to the incumbent are de- 
noted R. An innovation is drastic if it would drive the 
incumbent from the market; i.e., if c &lt; co where co is the 
maximum level of unit cost such that 7T/(c) = 0. In the 
interest of brevity, the reader is referred to my 1983 
article for more complete definitions and the derivation 
of payoff functions. 
5Assuming that success in R&D is a function of fixed 
rather than flow costs, Richard Freeman (1982) finds 
that a single domestic entrant will conduct more parallel 
projects than an incumbent foreign monopolist. Thus 
this result does not depend upon the fixed vs. flow 
specification of costs. 
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assumption. They show that in equilibrium 
the incumbent will choose an entry-deterring 
level of investment. However, this investment 
level will not be credible without some mech- 
anism for commitment. They remark that 
Whether preemption will occur ulti- 
mately rests on the extent to which 
firms can make prior entry-deterring 
commitments that are credible to 
potential competitors. We would argue 
that the incumbent has a natural tem- 
poral advantage since after all he is the 
incumbent, in which case the central 
issue is one of credibility. [p. 242] 
That monopoly power per se should confer a 
first-mover advantage seems debatable at 
best. One could argue equally persuasively 
the obverse claim that the potential entrant 
should have the first move, since the in- 
cumbent may not be aware of its existence or 
intent to invest until it actually does so. The 
entrant's investment alerts the incumbent to 
its presence, and it is the incumbent who 
must respond. 
Even if one concedes a first-mover ad- 
vantage to the monopolist, there remains the 
issue of credibility. In their original paper, 
G-N state that their purpose is to determine 
"whether institutions such as the patent sys- 
tem create opportunities for firms with mo- 
nopoly power to maintain their monopoly 
power" (p. 514). However, if the difference in 
our respective results is due to their assump- 
tion that the incumbent can credibly commit 
itself to a preemptive investment level, then 
the responsibility for persistent monopoly 
clearly does not reside with the patent sys- 
tem, but with the (implicit) institution which 
facilitates an otherwise noncredible threat. 
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